Paul J. Saunders writes: \u00a0Russia and Turkey have had a long, often tumultuous relationship, and some of their\u00a0difficulties are not so distant. Before Moscow invaded and annexed Crimea earlier this year, Russian-Turkish relations had been on a dramatic upswing, with two-way trade reaching some $32 billion in 2013 (mostly Turkish imports of Russian natural gas) and Russia becoming Turkey\u2019s No. 2 trading partner, behind Germany. Turkey had also emerged as Russia\u2019s No. 1 trade partner in services, according to Russian Central Bank statistics, and the leading destination for Russian tourists (some 4 million in 2013), although recent advertisements on Russian state television are encouraging them to go to Crimea.instead.<\/p>\n
Two years ago, Russia and Turkey agreed on visa-free travel for their citizens, allowing stays of one and later two to three months.\u00a0 On the political front, Russia and Turkey established the High Level Cooperation Council in 2010, which has met four times and may convene its fifth session in Turkey before the end of the year. Russian and Turkish officials appear to consult regularly on significant regional issues.<\/p>\n
Although Moscow and Ankara do not always agree on how to proceed on issues, their communications appear to be far more regular and substantive than Putin\u2019s exchanges with any other NATO member, especially after the alliance shut down the NATO-Russia Council earlier this year.<\/p>\n
Perhaps most remarkable is that while Erdogan continues to press Putin about the
\nCrimean Tatars and their priorities, Turkey has abstained from Western efforts to
\npunish Moscow over Ukraine, maintaining a rather moderate tone. This stands in starkcontrast to the other governments most directly affected \u2014 namely, the Central
\nEuropean NATO members \u2014 which have tried to push NATO and the United States
\ninto doing more and which in many cases are seeking US and NATO troop
\ndeployments on their territory.<\/p>\n
The US-EU strategy for dealing with Moscow, such as it is, relies primarily on economic rather than military instruments.\u00a0 Turkey does not look particularly interested in lining up with the United States and the EU to confront Moscow.\u00a0 Turkey\u2019s ambassador to Russia declared that his government would not impose sanctions on Russia if
\nasked by its allies. Earlier, in August, Turkey offered to increase food exports to Russia
\nafter Moscow banned many European foodstuffs and suggested using national
\ncurrencies rather than dollars in bilateral trade. A month earlier, Ankara had inquired
\nabout a free trade agreement with the Russia-led Customs Union. In early May, less
\nthan two months after the Crimea annexation, state-owned Turkish Airlines announced
\nplans to reinstate flights there.<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s relative success with Turkey likely extends beyond mere active diplomacy to also reflect a gradual, underlying shift in Ankara\u2019s perception of its national interests and goals as its efforts to join the EU recede.\u00a0 Moscow sees Turkey as a key market and service provider.\u00a0 Looking ahead, there is still room for growth in bilateral trade. The combination of Russia\u2019s energy resources and Turkey\u2019s location straddling three continents creates
\nconsiderable synergies that could be appealing to Russia, not to mention that Turkey
\nprovides state-owned Gazprom with yet another route around Ukraine to Europe.<\/p>\n
Turkey also appears to share some of Moscow\u2019s perspectives on the need to reform
\nthe international financial system to accommodate emerging economies.<\/p>\n
For now, Moscow and Ankara appear to have found a way to compartmentalize their
\ndisagreements so they do not detract materially from their overall bilateral relationship.
\nWith Erdogan having moved from being prime minister to president and former Foreign
\nMinister Ahmet Davutoglu taking over the premiership, Turkey seems likely to sustain
\nits current policy toward Moscow, and Russia seems likely to reciprocate.<\/p>\n
Paul J. Saunders writes: \u00a0Russia and Turkey have had a long, often tumultuous relationship, and some of their\u00a0difficulties are not so distant. Before Moscow invaded and annexed Crimea earlier this year, Russian-Turkish relations had been on a dramatic upswing, with … Continue reading ![\"Turkish](\"http:\/\/www.w-t-w.org\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/11\/Turkish-Ties-300x285.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"